When Love Becomes a Signaling Game The Problem of This Age.

 Do you feel lonely? If so, you are not alone, because 61% say they do! We are deep into a mental health crisis. We are raising the loneliest generation on record (Gen Z) (Cigna, 2020), closely followed by Millennials. With the digitalization of the world and the alienation of people, it has become harder to find a partner offline. Thus, for many young people, dating and partner selection have moved increasingly online (Rosenfeld, Thomas and Hausen, 2019).

Source: Opinion and Lifestyle survey from the office for National Statistics

There are multiple things we look for in a partner in our lives, and online “dating markets,” such as Hinge, help people to find perfect fits. But then, you face a very common problem that economists call asymmetric information (Akerlof, 1970). This occurs when you do not have full information in an interaction, while the person you interact with does. In the online dating context, you don’t really know the person ‘from Hinge’ as well as they know themselves, do you? While in the past this problem was solved or at least minimised by knowing a person from school, church or a relative, now many interact with strangers on dating platforms. Now, how do you ensure that this person is a good fit for you or isn't lying? Well, you look for a signal!

 

Signalling the Solution

 

Watch closely now, because this is the gist of it. In economics, a signal is a hard-to-fake clue about a hidden quality (Spence, 1973). But a signal only works when it has differential cost: it must be easier for the “right” person to get than for the “wrong” one. If I want a curious partner, a two-hour Coursera certificate tells me very little, because almost anyone can get it. A PhD tells me more, not because it proves curiosity perfectly, but because it is much more costly for a non-curious person to complete.

When this happens, we get a separating equilibrium: different types sort themselves out because the better signal is too costly for the wrong type to copy. But if both the genuinely curious and the merely strategic can show the same signal, then we get a pooling equilibrium: everyone looks similar, and the signal loses value. The same logic applies to wealth. A Justin Bieber mug tells me nothing. A Ferrari tells me more, because it is much harder for the wrong person to obtain. In short, signals help only when they separate; when they pool, they turn into noise.

 

Problems with Signalling.

 

We know very well that signals are not 100% representative of a trait, yet they serve as a selection criterion in our ‘dating game’. As useful as they are, they can also be harmful if stretched to the extreme. This fact creates a second dynamic: an extreme overreliance on signals. A lack of the right signals leaves a potentially perfect partner on mute. In other words, a highly curious person without a degree may not ‘register on my radar’. Even though they have all the hidden qualities, there would be a lack of an easily observable clue. Conversely, people in the non-target group can still fake or obtain a signal: posting a photo with a Ferrari that isn't actually theirs or renting it. Especially if the signal’s value is high, there is a higher incentive to cheat in the dating game by faking it. People might buy a fake watch to signal financial stability or post a fake diploma on their profile (yes, some people even get employed this way!). Economists refer to this as dishonest signalling. When signals can be easily mimicked, people with various qualities may seem indistinguishable. This makes it hard to recognise who is genuine, thus users are usually misled. As trust fails, people base their decisions on expected quality rather than actual quality. High-quality individuals are undervalued, while lower-quality ones seem more appealing. As a result some genuine high-quality users may leave the market. This is what economists call adverse selection, where the fakers push the genuine people entirely out of the market.

The incentive to cheat is high as we live in an age where the signal is so important online. This leads to many people creating fake profiles to scam naive users or generating fake photos of a trip to Bali. If not mitigated, this accelerates adverse selection: people who are not faking it will seem less attractive, while people who do fake it look like they live the most incredibly fun lives. Moreover, this drastically lowers trust in platforms, and the value of any signal plummets. This creates a massive incentive for online dating apps to invest in anti-AI tools. Many dating platforms, like Bumble, have already created fake-image detectors that can flag 95% of fake profiles (Bumble Inc., 2024). Because online dating is largely based on signalling, if the value of all signals goes down, the value of the app dissipates as well. The platforms that do will take over. Here, a larger question arises: was an overreliance on signals by our society, even if tech giants solve the fake signal problem in dating, a good choice to begin with, regardless of what dating apps and tech giants attempt to convince us of? That is not only economic but also a moral question for you.

 

Conclusion.

 

In conclusion, the 21st century offers us increased choice in finding a partner. It offers a wide variety of choices, but it also overemphasises the importance of observable signals that you can capture in a photo. At the same time, with all of this choice now available to us, we are the loneliest we have ever been. So, is the method we decided to use to find our partners actually working? Honestly, we don’t have a definitive answer to this question, but it is something to take home and mull over. We end this blog with more questions than answers, as each person must first answer individually before a societal problem can be solved.

Reference list

Akerlof, G.A. (1970) 'The market for "lemons": Quality uncertainty and the market mechanism', The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84(3), pp. 488–500.

Bumble Inc. (2024) Bumble Inc. launches Deception Detector™️: An AI-powered shield against spam, scam and fake profiles. Available at: https://www.nasdaq.com/press-release/bumble-inc.-launches-deception-detectortm:-an-ai-powered-shield-against-spam-scam-and (Accessed: 17 April 2026).

Cigna. (2020) Loneliness and the workplace: 2020 U.S. report. Available at: https://www.cigna.com/static/www-cigna-com/docs/about-us/newsroom/studies-and-reports/combatting-loneliness/cigna-2020-loneliness-report.pdf (Accessed: 17 April 2026).

Office for National Statistics (2025) Public opinions and social trends, Great Britain: January 2025. Available at: https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/wellbeing/bulletins/publicopinionsandsocialtrendsgreatbritain/january2025

Primack, B.A., Shensa, A., Sidani, J.E., Whaite, E.O., Lin, L.Y., Rosen, D., Colditz, J.B., Radovic, A. and Miller, E. (2017) 'Social media use and perceived social isolation among young adults in the U.S.', American Journal of Preventive Medicine, 53(1), pp. 1–8.

Rosenfeld, M.J., Thomas, R.J. and Hausen, S. (2019) 'Disintermediating your friends: How online dating in the United States displaces other ways of meeting', Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 116(36), pp. 17753–17758.

Spence, M. (1973) 'Job market signaling', The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 87(3), pp. 355–374.